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Pre-Independence 
Genocide is a cruel word, one that 
would not exist in a sane world. Yet 
how else can we describe Rwanda, 
where at least half a million people 
have been slaughtered since April 
1994. Tens of thousands more are dy- 
ing of cholera, hunger, and dehydra- 
tion in overcrowded camps just across 
the border in Zaire. Even in the rela- 
tivelywell-supplied camps on the Tan- 
zanian frontier, killers and victims 
coexist in a tense environment. 
Rwanda is part of the interlacustrine 
zone of East Central Africa, bordered 
by Lake Victoria in the northeast and 
Lake Tanganyika in the southwest. 
Unlike most of tropical Africa, this re- 
gion is densely populated and has a 
history of feudal-type states. Four hun- 
dred years ago in Rwanda, as else- 
where, the Hindu or Hima pastoral 
peoples (the Tutsi) established he- 
gemony over the agriculturist Bantu, 
called Hutu in Rwanda. Yet hegemony 
was not exclusively or even primarily 
a matter of conquest, but really a fu- 
sion based on symbiosis. Tutsi herders 
raised cattle on land that would not 
support crops (composted cattle ma- 
nure doubles or triples the yield of 
plantain, the staple food: see Smith, 
1985). In the precolonial feudal state of 
Gasabo, both groups benefited from 
their association as they had more food 
and therefore could organize better 
defence and enjoy greater security. 
AsNkongoli (1994) points out, Hutu 
and Tutsi could both change status and 
aspire to be decision makers. Even if a 
Tutsi king controlled a central state, it 
was the chiefs and subchiefs who ruled 
at a regional level, and the village 
elders who made most of the day-to- 
day decisions. The Germans control- 
led this area until it was mandated to 
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the Belgians in 1917. The Belgian legis- 
lature passed the Mortehan Law in 
1926, which directed the Kings to ap- 
point only Tutsi as chiefs, and gave the 
Kings and chiefs greater powers, sala- 
ries, and tax collection rights, which 
they often abused. When a King op- 
posed Belgian laws or policy he could 
be deposed; this is what happened in 
1931 when the Belgians deposed King 
Musinga and replaced him with his 
son Mutara 111 (Kamukama 1993). 
The Tutsi chiefs were doubly re- 
sented because they enjoyed special 
privileges and, simultaneously, they 
had to enforce unpopular policies such 
as taxes, forced labour, and punish- 
ment for violators. By 1953, the Bel- 
gians realized that the appointed Tutsi 
chiefs were extremely unpopular and 
demanded that chiefs be elected. By 
this time the Hutu were rightly mis- 
trustful of the Belgian authorities, and 
they resented the powers invested in 
the Tutsi minority, which accounted 
for about 15 percent of the population. 
Poverty also fuelled the unrest. As 
early as the 1920s, the smallholder cof- 
fee growers of Uganda and the Bukoba 
region of Tanzania, themselves rela- 
tively poor farmers, began to hire 
Rwandese migrant coffee pickel's at 
starvation wages. These impoverished 
landless or nearly landless Hutu, who 
migrated during the coffee harvest, 
were fleeing almost perpetual famine. 
By the mid-1950~~ the Hutu began to 
organize popular movements, such as 
the Hutu Social Movement and the 
Association for the Social Promotion 
of the Masses, both established in 1957. 
By 1959, the Hutu-based opposition 
joined forces under the banner of the 
Parti du Mouvement de 1'Eman- 
cipation Hutu, PARMEHUTU. Mili- 
tant anti-colonial Tutsi, wary of Hutu 
nationalism, set up their own party, the 
Union Nationale Rwandaise, UNAR. 
UNAR and PARMEHUTU militants 
first clashed in November 1959, and 
the result of this first ethnic conflict 
was that thousands of Tutsi were killed 
and at least 20,000 went into exile. 
Rwanda subsequently abolished the 
monarchy in January 1961, held two 
set$ of elections, and gained independ- 
ence on July 1,1962. 
Post-Independence 
By the early 1 9 6 0 ~ ~  two dangerous pat- 
terxts emerged: raids into Rwanda, and 
foreign intervention to prop up the 
Rwiandese government. Many Tutsi 
weie forced to flee their homeland and 
those that remained were subject to 
periodic repression. With little or noth- 
ing to lose, the Tutsi refugees began to 
launch the first guerrilla attacks. They 
called themselves Innyenzi (cock- 
roaches), because they raided at night 
and then fled back across the Zairean, 
Ugandan, or Tanzanian borders. Al- 
thopgh some Tutsi attained success in 
neighbouring countries, especially 
Uganda and, to a lesser extent, Tanza- 
nia, they never truly attained security 
in those countries where, as a warrior 
refugee community, they were both 
feaied and mistrusted by neighbours 
and by governments wary of violating 
the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) rules against interfering in an- 
other African country. 
Over one million Rwandans, who 
begian arriving in the 1 9 6 0 ~ ~  are resi- 
dents of Uganda; about one-half of 
then are registered refugees (Kiddu- 
Malkubuya, 1994). Most settled in the 
southwestern part of the country 
where they would blend in with the 
Anwe, a related interlacustrine pasto- 
ral people. The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
set up six camps in this region where 
people were free to "come and go- 
with remarkable social consequences" 
(Kiddu-~akubuya, 1994). In the 1960s, 
the Obote government passed the Con- 
trol d Alien Refugees Act, which made 
the Rwandans a special class of resi- 
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dent subject to arbitrary questioniqg or 
even detention. In the 1970s, undet Idi 
Amin, the government set up five 
large-scale ranching schemes that de- 
generated into violent conflict with lo- 
cal resident "squatters." The 
government blamed the Rwandan 
refugees for causing the trouble. By far 
the worst incident was in the Mbarara 
district in 1982, when officials 
launched a hate campaign against the 
Rwandese. young members of 0bdte's 
Uganda People's Congress (UPC) 
formed gangs and a paramilitary spe- 
cial force that killed and raped at will. 
At least 35,000 Rwandans fled their 
homes. Many young men joiped 
Musoveni's National Resistance Army 
(NRA) that was then in the bush, fight- 
ing a guerrilla war against Obpte. 
When the NRA took power in 1986, 
there were at least five thousand qell- 
armed, experienced, and well-trained 
fighters who formed the core of the 
RPF armed forces. When they left the 
Ugandan army en masse in 1990, they 
took weapons with them, and thwe- 
fore had at least covert support $om 
the government of Uganda. 
The second dangerous precedent 
was European interference in the 
Rwandan conflict. This began in 1959, 
when Belgian authorities detained 919 
Tutsi compared to 312 Hutu. As e rly 
as 1961, the Rwandese army, le 4' by 
Belgian officers, barely managed to 
repulse an invasion force of Tutsi at- 
tackers that came within 20 kilomqters 
of Kigali. Tutsi-dominated guerrbllas 
invaded ten times between 1961 and 
1966. To counter these attacks, and in 
revenge, the Hutu organized gqngs 
that killed tens of thousands of T p i ,  
including the leaders of UNAR and 
other organizations. Later, in 1979, a 
few young Rwandese refugees formed 
the Rwandese Alliance for National 
Unity which, in 1987, forged itself into 
the Rwandese Patriotic Front, RPF. The 
RPF tried for three years to negotiate 
the unconditional return of all 
Rwandan refugees and to accorqh all 
Rwandese equal rights. After Presi- 
dent Habaryimana stated that Rwanda 
was already overpopulated and could 
not take in any more people, the &PF 
took up arms. The RPF persisted de- 
spite heavy losses and the deaths of 
key military leaders, such as General 
Fred Rwigyema and Majors Chris 
Bunyenyezi and Peter Baingana, all 
killed in October 1990. After a series of 
attacks and reprisals, the RPF was 
close to military victory in January 
1993, and it was only because of inter- 
vention by French, Belgian, and 
Zairian troops that the Habyarimana 
government could stay in power. The 
cruel irony here is that the same colo- 
nial powers who supported and 
strengthened the Tutsi monarchy, 
through subsequent military interven- 
tions, kept a million Tutsi refugees in 
exile by preventing a military victory. 
On July 19,1994 the RPF swore in a 
new government of "national unity;" 
but unity will be difficult to attain with 
one-half million refugees (mostly 
Hutu) in Tanzania and as many as two 
million panic-stricken Hutu flooding 
into Zaire, where tens of thousands are 
dying of cholera and starvation 
(Weekly Review, Kenya, July 22, 1994). 
The new President, Pasteur 
Bizimungu, and the new Prime Minis- 
ter, Faustin Twagiramungu, are both 
Hutu, but there are few moderate Hutu 
left alive. Can the new government 
prevent killings in retaliation for the 
half-million people slaughtered by 
former members of Habyarimana's 
armed forces and the dreaded civilian 
militia, the interahamwe? Obviously, 
many of these ruthless killers are now 
refugees or in hiding. We can only 
hope that another round of slaughter 
can be avoided. 
Judging by the previous experi- 
ences of Rwandans in exile, there is no 
permanent refuge in neighbouring 
countries. Tanzania has been the most 
generous country to date, but even 
there the political climate may at times 
present difficulties. Mwanza on Lake 
Victoria is the closest large Tanzanian 
city, and the Rwandan community 
there numbers about five thousand, 
including about one thousand new ar- 
rivals; almost all are Tutsi and rela- 
tively well-to-do, since they were the 
only ones who could reach this safe 
haven during the present emergency. 
The day former President 
Habyarimana's plane was shot down, 
the Mwanza Rwandan community 
staged a public celebration. Given Tan- 
zanian President Mwinyi's key role in 
trying to broker a negotiated settle- 
ment to the long-standing conflict, this 
public display was a misguided re- 
sponse. President Mwinyi was in 
Mwanza on official business and, 
when he learned of the celebration, he 
became upset because of the Arusha 
accord and Tanzania's role in trying to 
mediate the peace process. Mwinyi 
then ordered a roundup of the commu- 
nity leaders by the police. According to 
my sources (Street Kids International), 
they were later all released, but the 
community is keeping a very low pro- 
file and the newer arrivals are under- 
ground. 
These Tutsi may have been in Tan- 
zania for years; many young people 
have grown up in Mwanza, and some 
born in Tanzania are more Tanzanian 
than Rwandan. Will these youthful 
Tanzanian and Ugandan children of 
exiles want to repatriate? This will de- 
pend on their level of ethnic identity 
and on future developments in the 
war-torn nation. Rwanda will need the 
skills and determination of its exiles to 
attain peace and prosperity. 
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